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ABSTRACT This article explores the (passive) role of the Dutch government in the CIA
extraordinary rendition ﬂights (ERFs), also known as “torture ﬂights”. It shows why
researching ERFs, as a crime of the powerful, is inherently problematic. Afterward, a concise
overview follows of European involvement in ERFs and reluctance to investigate them. The
article then considers the (known) facts and legal responsibility of the Netherlands regarding
the ERFs, concluding with a discussion of the Dutch political discourse of denial of ERF
involvement. The main argument is that the discourse of ERF denial ﬁts and reﬂects the
colonial present in which the Dutch government resides, concealing its darkest pages in
history while hiding behind its contemporary (political) culture of tolerance and progres-
siveness.
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Introduction
‘‘We don’t kick the (expletive) out of them (terrorism
suspects). We send them to other countries so they can kick
the (expletive) out of them’’ (anonymous US ofﬁcial in
Priest and Gellman, 2002: 2).
After 9/11, the CIA sought to obtain information onpossible terrorist activities by applying practices oftorturing suspects (Feinstein, 2014). The US tried to
circumvent various human rights treaties by extraditing suspects
to third countries such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Yemen and
Uzbekistan. In these countries, human rights protection is poor
and thus torture-techniques could be applied during interroga-
tions (Barry et al., 2004; Bader and De Jong, 2006: 14;
Satterthwaite, 2007: 6). These extraditions are referred to as
CIA “torture ﬂights” (Cobain and Quinn, 2011) or “torture taxis”
(Scahill, 2013). Ofﬁcially they are called extraordinary rendition
ﬂights (ERFs) comprising the transfer of an individual to a
country where (s)he will be interrogated on terrorists acts they
(may) have been responsible for, or in some way, involved
in; as distressing is that the individual has no possibility of a
legal proceeding to challenge the transfer (Boon et al., 2010).
According to the non-refoulement principle, refugees are
protected against being forcefully returned to a country where
they have reason to fear persecution and torture (UNHRC, 1977).
This principle is guaranteed either implicitly or explicitly in
several treaties such as the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). However, this principle has been circumvented
by the US and host countries participating in ERFs through
“diplomatic assurances” that the detainee will not be ill-treated
(Van Boven, 2002: 30–42; EP, 2012: 51). Circumventing human
rights through ERFs is typical of the War on Terror, making it,
according to Said (2003: 39), “the most reckless war in modern
times”, in which “[i]t is all about imperial arrogance unschooled
in worldliness, unfettered either by competence or experience,
undeterred by history or human complexity, unrepentant in its
violence and the cruelty of its technology”.
Since 4 October 2001, when the NATO allies met and agreed to
take measures, including allowing overﬂights and access to
airﬁelds, for stronger international cooperation in the War on
Terror, ERFs have increased in number (NATO, 2001). Conse-
quently, the CIA had to collaborate with other countries
(Marty, 2007), because the use of aircrafts depend on using other
nations’ airspace and airports (for example, for refuelling).
Therefore, other governments must be (passively) involved in
ERFs. This involvement has increasingly come under scrutiny as
the involved governments may be complicit in torture (Blakely,
2011; Cordell, 2017). The Netherlands is not listed as a
participating state in ERFs (OSJI, 2013) and seems to comply
with several torture prohibition and human rights treaties, such
as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Nonetheless, there were at
least 27 ERFs since 9/11 making use of Dutch territory (Amnesty
International (AI), 2006a; Fava, 2006; Van Boven, 2002). The
Dutch government still denies (to have any knowledge of) its
involvement.
Adopting a language that speaks of “extraordinary rendition
(ﬂights)” characterizes the War on Terror, and on a deeper level,
the colonial present (Gregory, 2010). This contribution will
explore how we ought to understand the (passive) involvement
of the Dutch government in that colonial present. First, we
will explain why researching the CIA’s Extraordinary Rendition
Programme (ERP), of which ERFs are part, is inherently
problematic. Second, we will provide a concise overview of
European involvement in ERFs and reluctance to investigate.
Third, we will consider (known) facts and legal responsibility of
the Netherlands regarding the ERFs. Afterward, we will scrutinize
the Dutch political discourse of denial (Cohen, 2002) of ERF
involvement, followed by a discussion.
Extraordinary ﬂights, secrecy and criminological research
The very fact that ERF documentation is mostly (kept) secret is
an intrinsic issue, as evidence is unavailable, and if available, it is
predominantly (considered) speculative (Brysk and Shaﬁr, 2007;
Efrat, 2015). Still, if anything, that unavailability and speculation
indicate that it is forbidden knowledge that governments prefer
to be (kept) secret, whereas it should be made transparent for
investigation, or at the very least, shared publicly (Kempner et al.,
2011). Logically, that unavailability and speculation pose
challenges for researching ERFs as a state crime (Tombs and
Whyte, 2003). Consequently, we cannot provide a full picture of
the ERFs and Dutch involvement, because accurate information
can only be given by authorities and other organizations that
remain reluctant to provide such information; if only because they
are not investigated and/or not ordered by the Dutch government
to share such information, revealing a reluctance of the Dutch
government itself. Giving an accurate overview is further
complicated because, next to the CIA, more agencies have been
involved such as the US Department of Defense and the FBI
(Mayer, 2005; Messineo, 2009). Therefore, we have taken on board
recommendations to utilize publicly available ﬂight data and other
relevant data on known and suspected ERFs to evidence their
existence, and document their characteristics (Raphael et al., 2016;
Cordell, 2017). That information shows that a signiﬁcant amount
of individuals have been sent to third countries, of which some
were detained at CIA “black sites”1 (Satterthwaite, 2008), and
despite estimation differences, there seems to have been an increase
in the number of observed cases (Brysk and Shaﬁr, 2007; Efrat,
2015; Raphael et al., 2016). However, as AI (2006a, b) points out,
ﬂight records do not include all of the stops a plane makes during a
trip away from US airspace. Neither is all relevant air trafﬁc
registered, meaning ﬂight data is not representative of the number
of ERFs because case details of ﬂights are not provided due to the
secret nature of ERFs. Data on ERF landings at Dutch airports are
most likely incomplete, and we, therefore, also studied reports of
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), (critical) media reports
and documentaries, and, especially for our scrutiny of the political
discourse, documented (ofﬁcial) responses coming from the
political domain (Brysk and Shaﬁr, 2007; Blakeley and Raphael,
2013; Brooks, 2016; Raphael et al., 2016; Cordell, 2017).
European involvement in ERFs
ERFs depend on other nation states’ assistance (Nowak, 2008),
making it highly unlikely that of the 54 countries that covertly
helped/are helping the US by allowing ERFs through and on their
territory (OSJI, 2013), not one of them was European (Marty,
2007; Bakowski, 2012). This is even more unlikely, because 19
NATO allies, including the Netherlands and other European
states, agreed to the eight measures to contribute to the war
against terrorism (NATO, 2001). Evidence provided by Euro-
control, the US Federal Aviation Authority, and data from the
Polish Air Navigation Services Agency (PANSA) supports the
idea that European states must have played a role (The Rendition
Project, 2010a; Blakeley; 2011; Blakeley and Raphael,
2013; Raphael et al., 2016). However, the USA and its partner
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governments have remained unwilling to provide ofﬁcial
investigators with information on ﬂight schedules, landings
and transfers, due to reasons of national security (OSJI, 2013).
So, “to date, the full scale and scope of foreign government
participation—as well as the number of victims—remains
unknown” (ibid. 5).
This does not mean there is no information available. Ofﬁcial
reports from the Egyptian government stated that 60–70 detainees
had been transferred to its custody between September 2001 and
May 2005 (Waterman, 2005). Investigative journalists have
reported that 4 years after 9/11 over 70 detainees have been
subjected to extraordinary rendition (Priest and Gellman, 2002).
Other sources estimate 100–150 transferees (Mayer, 2005), and
some even speak of several thousand ERF cases (Center for Human
Rights and Global Justice ((CHRGJ), 2014)). More recent ﬁndings
indicate that over 400 suspicious ﬂights have landed in 81 countries
worldwide since 9/11 (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013). As for Europe,
around 1254 CIA ﬂights had taken place in European airspace
between 2001 and 2005 (Fava, 2007). Fava stated that “[t]he routes
for some of these ﬂights seem to be quite suspect [...] they are rather
strange routes for ﬂights to take. It is hard to imagine [...] those
stopovers were simply for providing fuel” (Sturcke, 2006—online).
Concrete European involvement is evidenced by the Abu Omar
case, in which several Italian policemen and CIA agents
kidnapped Usama Mostafa Hassan Nasr who was subsequently
rendered in the Gulfstream IV N85VM to Egypt via Aviano
Airbase in Italy and then Germany. He ended up in Egypt where
he was held at two different detention sites and subjected to
numerous forms of torture, making Italy complicit in torture
(The Rendition Project, 2002: 10; Messineo, 2009). Another case
is that of the German Muhammad Zammer, who travelled from
Germany to Morocco where he got arrested and ﬂown to Syria;
there is evidence that the German government provided
Zammer’s travel plans to US ofﬁcials (Hawkins, 2005: 252–253;
AI, 2011). In particular Poland has played an active role in several
ERFs. After serious allegations, Polish politicians were no longer
able to lie about CIA prisons existing in Poland, after which the
policy of denial was changed into attempting to justify their
existence by reasons of necessity, national interest and the
need for international cooperation with the US authorities and
intelligence (Bodnar and Pacho, 2012). Speciﬁcally regarding
Polish involvement in ERFs, PANSA ﬂight data showed that CIA
registered planes landed in Poland, which led the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) to rule that Poland was a signiﬁcant
enabler for the CIA using Polish airspace and airports, and thus
complicit as it disguised movements of ERF aircrafts and
provided logistics and services, including special security
arrangements and special landing procedures (ECtHR, 2014a, b).
In 2012 the European Parliament (EP) urged the European
member states to investigate their involvement in ERFs (EP,
2012), nevertheless, most European countries have refused
participation, are merely denying and not carrying out inquiries
(Marty, 2007: 62), or are claiming non-disclosure and omitting
investigations because of “state secrecy” and “national security”
reasons (EP, 2012: 10). ibid. 51). In reaction to that European
reluctance, and after the ruling on Poland’s complicity in the
CIA’s ERP, the EP announced in February 2015 that it would
resume inquiries into the extent of the CIA’s extraordinary
rendition activities in Europe. Hesitant European countries that
are not starting judicial investigations into their role in the CIA
programme have been urged to investigate and publish the results
(EP, 2015; Raphael et al., 2016). So far, only Germany, Italy and
Spain have investigated their ERF involvement, of which the case
ﬁndings remain unavailable (Boon et al., 2010: 279–280). To date,
no such investigation has taken place in the Netherlands, despite
compelling known facts.
Known facts about ERFs and complicity of the Dutch state
Overﬂights and landings in the Netherlands. Human Rights
Watch (HRW) alleged that by denying asylum to Muhammed
Abu Farsan, the Netherlands violated his rights against unlawful
return by transferring him to Sudan (where he held a passport)
from where he was sent to Libya to be tortured during CIA
interrogations (2012: 111–115). There is, however, no clear evi-
dence (available) that Dutch state ofﬁcials were indeed aware of
the possible transfer to Libya, meaning it is unclear whether the
ofﬁcials actively participated in an unlawful transfer. Besides that
allegation, and as far as is known, the Netherlands accommodates
no “black sites” for secret detention on their territories (ECtHR,
2014a, 2014b,; Rafael et al., 2016), nor have any Dutch state
ofﬁcials been involved in ERP/ERF-related arrests or transfers,
sent to other countries to torture, or provided information that
would lead to torturous interrogations (UNHRC, 2010; AI,
2010: 34).
Nonetheless, regarding ERFs, it has been claimed that the “[f]
lights of the CIA come to [the Netherlands] for decades now. […]
We always say we know about nothing” (anonymous: former
employee of Dutch intelligence services in Alberts, 2005—online).
Aviation specialist, Chris Yates, explains that Dutch airspace must
have been used by the CIA of which Dutch government must
have been aware:
Most governments are consciously blind: what is in an
airplane that lands and leaves from an airport is for them
no cause of concern. They could get that information, but
rather do not want to know. […] Such an approach gives
governments a certain deniability (ibid.).
ERFs appear to have been permanently operated by the
CIA through shell companies, of which Presidential Aviation is
an example; its planes used Dutch airports frequently (AI, 2006a:
28). Path Corporation also acts as a CIA shell company,
and had on 16 November 2005 its De Havilland DHC-
8-315B type N505LL, coming from Azerbaijan, via Istanbul
airport, to land at Schiphol Airport (Fava, 2006: 15). The then
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management
conﬁrmed the landing at Schiphol, stating that the airplane left
for Iceland on 17 November 2005 to an “unknown destination”;
its ﬂight plan stated it was a “non-scheduled” ﬂight (Alberts,
2005).
In 2005, a list provided by the Icelandic air trafﬁc management
unit was mentioned on Dutch television; CIA ﬂights were
registered leaving Keﬂavík International Airport in Reykjavik
(Zembla, 2005). In total, at least 27 overﬂights were made through
Dutch airspace by CIA-registered planes. Allegedly, most of those
ﬂights were operated by the airplane Gulfstream V jet with the
registration N379P which is one of the more notorious ERF
planes (Fava, 2007). It transferred Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed
al-Zari from Sweden to Egypt in 2001 who were detained and
tortured for several months in Egypt (The Rendition Project,
2010b). Six ERFs used Rotterdam/The Hague Airport but it
remains unclear whether there were persons aboard and why
those planes arrived there. Philippe Domogala, a former air chief
who monitored the ﬂights through Dutch airspace, mentioned
that various ERFs from Washington to Frankfurt must have
crossed Dutch airspace (Zembla, 2005). It is, however, difﬁcult to
discover who was aboard the planes due to the unclear purpose of
the ﬂights (ibid. at 0:02:58). For example, the N505LL is a civil
plane, for which, Domogala explains, it is only necessary to
provide the number of passengers aboard and not the names.
Therefore, Domogala states, the current aviation regulations
make it easy not to disclose passenger details, while CIA-planes
can easily change their registration in the US (ibid. 0:37:00),
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which complicates any possibility of a hosting nation to justify
inspection.
Airplanes N505LL and N379P were not the only suspect planes
using Dutch (aerial) territory. Since 2002, several alleged CIA-
planes arrived at Dutch airports (Fava, 2006): Amsterdam,
Groningen and Rotterdam. Next to the De Haviland, the
Gulfstream III N829MG (later re-registered as N259SK) arrived
on 20 July 2002 at Schiphol and left for Bangor (USA) the next
day (ibid. 51). This airplane was used for the deportation of
Maher Arar, and had frequently landed at Dutch Airports
(Alberts, 2006). On April 8, 2003, it arrived again at Schiphol,
leaving the next day to Sweden, landing multiple times at
Schiphol and once at Groningen Airport. The Groningen Airport
warden, Mr O. de Jong, could not provide any information on
that landing because of “secrecy”, and additional information is
not registered, stating, “as long as they pay, that’s most important
for us” (ibid. online).
Out of the known 15 arrivals in the Netherlands, on 22
September 2002, 18 May 2005, 21 July 2005 and in August 2005,
the Gulfstream V N1HC, another alleged CIA airplane, landed
speciﬁcally at Schiphol Airport and at Rotterdam/The Hague
Airport. Logs of the N1HC's ﬂight history show that it made
frequent use of Dutch Airports in the months November and
December in 2005, and in February in 2006 (Fava, 2006: 39):
Departure Arrival Date.
Amsterdam (Netherlands) Rotterdam (Netherlands) 09/08/2005
Rotterdam (Netherlands) Bangor (USA) 09/08/2005
White Plains (USA) Rotterdam (Netherlands) 01/11/2005
Rotterdam (Netherlands) Frankfurt (Germany) 02/11/2005
Frankfurt (Germany) Rotterdam (Netherlands) 14/12/2005
Rotterdam (Netherlands) New York (USA) 15/12/2005
New York (USA) Rotterdam (Netherlands) 08/02/2006
Rotterdam (Netherlands) Bruxelles (Belgium) 08/02/2006
Bruxelles (Belgium) Rotterdam (Netherlands) 09/02/2006
Rotterdam (Netherlands) Amsterdam (Netherlands) 09/02/2006
Amsterdam (Netherlands) Zurich (Switzerland) 09/02/2006
Other CIA aircrafts were registered under N829MG, N1HC and
N505LL; all used Dutch Airports (Fava, 2006: 51). Remarkable
was the unwillingness of the European Union’s anti-terrorism
coordinator, Gijs de Vries, to assist during the inquiry, which
made him suspect of withholding information and denying
(access to) information for investigation purposes (Trouw, 2007).
Despite ERF landings at and overﬂights over the Netherlands,
Dutch authorities and governmental representatives did and still
do not provide clarity about the reasons for (non-interference in)
ERFs taking place on Dutch territory. The question, therefore,
becomes to which extent there has been a “duty to investigate”, as
Maxime Verhagen, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs 2007–2010,
referred to (Senate, 2009: 2–4). If the government had a duty to
investigate but did not comply, is the Dutch government
(passively) complicit in ERFs, and thus, in practices of torture
(cf. Modvig and Jaranson, 2004)?
State responsibility and complicity in torture. The Netherlands
complies with the eight NATO measures to expand the options
available in the campaign against terrorism (Marty, 2007: 19),
implying awareness of ERFs, especially because two of those
measures are: (a) providing blanket overﬂight clearances for the
USA’ and other Allies’ aircrafts for military ﬂights related to
operations against terrorism and (b) providing access to ports and
airﬁelds on NATO territory, including for refuelling, for the USA
and other Allies for operations against terrorism (NATO, 2001).
Given the known facts, complicity of the Netherlands in torture
becomes likely, because it failed to fulﬁll obligations according to
the CAT, ICCPR and the ECHR; especially regarding obligatory
investigations into credible claims about ERFs over one’s sover-
eign territory and (not) intervening in ERFs that used Dutch
airspace and airports to, for example, refuel or crew changes
(UNHRC, 2010: 130). Failing to investigate constitutes a violation
of those obligations, according to the UK Joint Committee on
Human Rights (2006). Providing overﬂight clearances and access
to airﬁelds incriminates the Netherlands, because allowing
overﬂights of individuals to secret detention sites or to face
extensive interrogation techniques may engender the responsi-
bility of a passive state and may amount to providing assistance,
which constitutes state complicity (Venice Commission, 2006:
32–35).
Passiveness of a state could mean “omission” (e.g., failure to
investigate) as codiﬁed in article 2 of Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASR), which, with the
breach of international obligations regarding torture, constitutes
an international wrongful act. Based on article 1 ASR, such an act
is the direct responsibility of a state. So, the Dutch government
has a duty to refrain from human rights violations and a duty to
take necessary measures within its powers to secure the rights of
individuals within the territory of that state by not allowing
overﬂights transferring individuals to third states where secret
detention and exposure to torture occurs. According to article 16
ASR, by providing arrival options on Dutch territory to refuel or
change crew, the Netherlands is complicit if it aids or assists
another state in an internationally wrongful act by the latter and if
it does so with the knowledge of the circumstances of the
international wrongful act (AI, 2006b; Venice Commission,
2006).
Given the fact there was widespread reporting on the
involvement of European states in ERFs, ﬂight records, NGO
reports, and individual cases that were brought before the ECtHR
that showed involvement of European states in the renditions
operations (UNHRC, 2010), it seems that there was or at least,
should have been a level of Dutch governmental knowledge of
ERFs as well as the ERP itself. Moreover, given the observations
of the De Havilland/N505LL and Gulfstream V N1HC landings at
Dutch airports, November 2005 to February 2006 (Fava, 2006)
and inquiries by Socialist Party Member, Harry Van Bommel,
about Dutch involvement in ERFs on 30th December 2004, show
that the government was (ofﬁcially made) aware of ERFs. Finally,
regarding “aid or assistance” under article 16 ASR, the Nether-
lands failed to prevent ERFs taking place through its sovereign
airspace, which makes the Dutch government complicit through
aiding/assisting ERFs. Although the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) ruled that complicity always requires pro-activity/positive
action to furnish “aid or assistance” under article 16 ASR (2007:
218–219), if the Netherlands did not object to the ERFs taking
place (which the frequent arrivals and departures of, for example,
De Havilland/N505LL and the Gulfstream V N1HC strongly
indicate), complicity is imminent considering legal doctrine that
suggests that misconduct may consist of action and omission
(Aust, 2013: 227).
International aviation law and complicity in torture. Referring
to the 1944 Civil Aviation Chicago Convention, Minister of
Foreign Affairs from 2003–2007, Ben Bot, argued it was not
necessary for airlines to provide prior information about pas-
sengers and cargo to authorities (TK, 2005d: 1946). He implies
there was no information available for concrete indications on
which Dutch authorities would have had to act. To this point,
what the cargo was and which destinations the several ERFs had,
remains unknown (to the wider public). However, the Dutch
government, as any government, is expected to carry out
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inspections according to article 3 of the Chicago Convention by
making distinctions between state aircrafts and civil aircrafts. Bot
explained that the involved aircrafts were civil aircrafts, limiting
the possibilities for Dutch government to investigate. A civil
aircraft, that is non-scheduled, may ﬂy over another state’s ter-
ritory and land on that territory for non-trafﬁc purposes such as
refuelling, without obtaining prior permission. Only a ﬂight plan
is required, according to article 5 of the Chicago Convention. This
limits sovereignty of a state with regards to civil aircraft. How-
ever, as each host state has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace above its national territory (article 1 Chicago
Convention), it is forbidden for state aircrafts to ﬂy over the
hosting nation when no authorization has been given, either by
special agreement or otherwise provided (article 3c Chicago
Convention). Even under customary international law, which
gives a state aircraft additional immunity, authorization is still
needed from the host state for the state aircraft to enter another
sovereign state’s airspace (Venice Commission, 2006: 22). Once
granted permission, the state aircraft cannot be searched or
seized, which would block the possibilities for the Netherlands,
for example, to inspect it (ibid.).
The US presents its ERF planes as civil aircrafts to avoid
necessary prior authorization (UK House of Commons Foreign
Affairs Committee, 2009: 26). However, they carry out a state
function transferring prisoners. Although there is no deﬁnition of
“state aircraft” in the Chicago Convention, a “state aircraft” is an
aircraft under control of the state and is being used for state-
intended purposes (Diederiks-Verschoor, 1997: 34), implying a
civil aircraft could become a state aircraft if it is used for the
speciﬁc purposes as mentioned in article 3(b) of the Chicago
Convention, meaning the aircraft’s status should be determined
by which function it has (Milde, 2008: 482). The ERF planes
presented themselves as civil planes but had state-intended
purposes for which authorization for overﬂight was given, which
is in breach of article 3 (c) of the Chicago Convention; the
Netherlands should have demanded their landing. Moreover, if a
contracting state uses civil aviation, for any purpose that is
inconsistent with the aims of the Chicago Convention (Venice
Commission, 2006: 22), such as violating human rights, the
Netherlands should have ordered airplanes to land. Furthermore,
if a state plane presented itself as being a state plane and obtained
overﬂight permission but did not disclose its mission, the
Netherlands should have contended that the ﬂag state violated
its international obligations (ibid.). Moreover, article 16 of the
Chicago Convention does not require “reasonable grounds” to
search an aircraft after it has landed. Without unreasonable delay,
the aircraft can be searched and its documents (for example,
passenger lists) inspected. If the captain then claims it is ﬂying a
state aircraft, which would principally grant immunity to the
plane, this will then constitute an abuse of civil aviation (Article 4
Chicago Convention), which also should have led to inspections
at Dutch airports.
The Netherlands also should have interfered with a civil
aircraft in ﬂight on which the passengers’ safety is jeopardized
(article 3 Tokyo Convention), wherein the jurisdiction of the host
state would prevail (Shubber, 1973: 53). The host state then,
according to article 4 Tokyo Convention, and reafﬁrmed by the
EP, inspections on board should be carried out in the name of
human rights protection (2006: paragraph 209) guaranteed by the
ECHR, the ICCPR, the CAT and the Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; no
European member state is (able to argue it is) barred by the
Chicago Convention or the Tokyo Convention to interfere with
an aircraft (2006: 26). Bot’s statement regarding how jurisdiction
of the registration country state applies to the aircraft as long as it
is “in ﬂight”, is correct (TK, 2007: 1385); however, he ignores the
duty to inspect according to its positive obligations concerning
the protection of human rights.
Despite provided known facts and key legal possibilities to
inspect several ERFs from November 2005 until February 2006,
the Dutch government performed no inspections and remains
unwilling to learn more about its role by taking responsibility to
investigate, and instead, provides a political discourse of ERF
denial.
The Dutch political discourse of ERF Denial
The Dutch government behaves similarly to how the Polish
government did previously: fully denying ERP/ERF involvement;
after strong allegations though denial was no longer possible for
the Polish government (Bodnar and Pacho, 2012). The Dutch
ERF denial seems to come forward from, as Herman and
Chomsky (2010) would explain, a (political) elite interest in
controlling media to eventually control public debate and dissent
from, in this case, Dutch complicity in torture. Dimitriu (2013:
563, 565) stated that “the Dutch managed to stay distanced from
torture accusations [and that…] the nature of these incidents
proved to be relatively harmless”. We challenge that (rather
naive) conclusion, and will consider the political distancing from
torture accusations (narrated by politicians who were part of the
Dutch cabinet) as a political discourse of ofﬁcial denial (Cohen,
2002: 101–116) of ERF involvement, sustaining and sustained by
the colonial present (Gregory, 2010, 2004). That discourse
consists of four subsequent phases from December 2004 until
June 2009: (1) narrating unawareness and unavailability of facts,
(2) accepting critique on (narrating) such unawareness and
unavailability, (3) silencing dissenting politicians and (4) normal-
izing plausible deniability.
Unawareness and unavailability of facts. The Dutch political
discourse of denial has been challenged (unsuccessfully to this
point) by opposition politicians. In particular Socialist Party
member Harry van Bommel asked stridently about Dutch
involvement in ERFs, starting 30 December 2004, when he con-
fronted Bot:
Have prisoners also been picked up in the Netherlands? If
so, who are they and where have/has he or she been
transported to? Did the vessels make any stopovers in the
Netherlands? If so, where and when? Where did the vessel
(s) go to and why have you given permission for it? (TK,
2005f: 2091)
Bot replied on 24 February 2005, claiming he had received no
conﬁrmation those transfers and ﬂights Van Bommel refers to
took place and to Bot’s knowledge there have been no stopovers
in the Netherlands either (ibid. 2092). Two weeks later, 11 March
2005, Van Bommel asked detailed questions about a speciﬁc
aircraft associated with the CIA and undertaking ERFs. A
Gulfstream registered under N379P and N44982 appeared to
have arrived at Schiphol Airport Friday 2 May 2003, ﬂying in
from Frankfurt, and owned by both Premier Executive Transport
Services and Keeler and Tate management (TK, 2005g: 3147). Bot
denied knowledge:
According to Schiphol Airport, a Gulfstream with registra-
tion number N379P never arrived 2 May 2003. It’s not
known to me whether Premier Executive Transport
Services is the owner of a Gulfstream with registration
number N379P. This company is not registered at the
Dutch Civil Aviation Authority, and therefore does not
possess a landing permit. […] It is not known to me
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whether a Gulfstream with registration number N379P
provided services to the American Ministry of Defence.
The company Keeler and Tate Management is not
registered at the Dutch Civil Aviation Authority, and
therefore does not possess a landing permit. As far as can
be checked, the Gulfstream with registration number
N44982 has not arrived in the Netherlands (ibid. 3184).
Van Bommel also asked whether any agreements have been
made between the American government and European countries
for use of their airports when transporting suspects of terrorism
and to what extent and why these agreements may be (kept)
secret. Once more, Bot claimed to know nothing about such
agreements (ibid.). In November 2005, Van Bommel and Bert
Koenders of the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) requested Bot to
investigate Dutch involvement in ERFs (Trouw, 2005a), yet no
concrete actions followed, as it was claimed that the Dutch Air
Trafﬁc Control’s had no information about the vessels’ purposes
(Volkskrant, 2005b).
In claiming that key information was not (made) available and
justifying political unawareness of available information on ERFs,
as well as by very speciﬁcally detailing there was no legal
obligation to inspect, appearing to act “lawful but awful” (Passas,
2005), Bot narrates ERF non-involvement and non-complicity in
torture, ultimately protecting “a system that does not respond to
civilian leadership” (Brooks, 2016: 351). That system revealed
itself when Europe confronted the US in December 2005 with its
CIA ERP and ERFs.
Accepting critique. Monday 5 December 2005, former United
States Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, was questioned by
European ministers about ERFs in Europe (Die Welle, 2005). Rice
responded that the USA did not use airspace or airports of any
country for the purpose of transporting a detainee to a country
where (s)he will be tortured (MERLN, 2005). However, at the
same time, she did not deny the existence of transfers; she merely
mentioned that the USA neither tortured nor exposed individuals
to torture (Volkskrant, 2005a). The next day, Van Bommel ﬁled
another set of questions to Bot for clariﬁcation on a list of 300
CIA ﬂights using European airspace (TK, 2005a). Bot persisted
that he had no clear indications that Dutch airspace was used for
illegal transfers of prisoners by the CIA or other American gov-
ernmental institutions. Regarding the answers Rice gave about
(allegedly) illegal detention facilities outside of the USA, Bot
claimed that these were “not satisfactory” and he announced
intent to engage in a “heavy discussion” with her during a NATO
meeting in Brussels on Wednesday 7 and Thursday 8 December
2005 (NATO, 2005; Volkskrant, 2005a). Bot’s reactions reﬂect the
political discourse of ERF denial in which he turns defensiveness
into partially acknowledging their criticism (Cohen, 2002: 102) to
satisfy critical politicians, but without conﬁrming their critique,
nor acknowledging complicity.
In 2003, the Dutch government offered its assistance to a US-
led effort in Afghanistan, however, “intense public opposition to
torture led Dutch political leaders to fear they would face
domestic backlash if their army helped apprehend al Qaeda or
Taliban members who then ended up at Guantanamo Bay”
(Johnson et al., 2016: 125). Two years later, that fear disappeared.
At the NATO conference dinner Wednesday 7 December 2005,
Rice explained to EU representatives that the US respects the
rights of suspects of terrorism. Present at the dinner were Bot and
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer who was the then 11th Secretary General
of NATO from 2004–2009, and who preceded Bot as Dutch
minister of Foreign Affairs from 2002–2003. De Hoop Scheffer
explained that Rice “cleared the skies” about, among other
concerns, ERFs (Trouw, 2005b). Bot stated he was “very satisﬁed”
about the assurances Rice gave. The next day, 8 December 2005,
NATO ministers agreed to expand the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in South Afghanistan in 2006 (TK,
2005b; Parlement en Politiek, 2006). Bot, together with the then
Minister of Defence, Henk Kamp, and Minister of Development
Coordination, Agnes van Ardenne, requested on 22 December
2005 to contribute Dutch soldiers to ISAF in South-Afghanistan
(Bot et al., 2005), which was approved by Parliament in February
2006; over a 1000 Dutch soldiers (eventually 2000) were sent to
the Afghan province Uruzgan (Dimitriu and De Graaf, 2010).
The politics behind the ISAF exemplify the inner workings of a
global network of “private military contractors, politicians and
the media [which] present[s] a disturbing picture of the level of
collusion between institutions, and an understanding of the
systematic nature of torture and its cover-up” (Brooks, 2016:
352). That network produces “[t]he colonial present […] through
geopolitics and geo-economics […] set in motion by presidents,
prime ministers and chief executives, the state, the military
apparatus and transnational corporations” (Gregory, 2004: 16).
The political narrative of being unaware and having no available
facts, in this case about ERFs, as well as (fabricated) political
acceptance of critique should not “blind us to the banality of the
colonial present and to our complicity in its horrors” (ibid.).
Critical, dissenting politicians can prevent such society-wide
blindness, if they are not silenced.
Silencing dissenting politicians. On Friday 9 December 2005,
both Van Bommel and Krista van Velzen, also a Socialist Party
member, ﬁled questions to Bot and the then Minister of Trans-
port, Public Works and Water Management, Sybillia Dekker,
regarding new information broadcast on Dutch television about
CIA ﬂights using Dutch airports; apparently, Rotterdam/The
Hague airport as well as Saint Martin Princess Juliana Interna-
tional Airport have been used multiple times for ERFs (TK,
2005c).2 Bot conﬁrmed there were six different types of aircrafts
that arrived at Rotterdam/The Hague Airport of which the cargo
was unregistered (TK, 2005d). He declared:
I have no reasons to assume that these are vessels that have
a role in an alleged global network of secret CIA-prisons.
After concerns about this expressed by the EU, Secretary of
State Rice has—repeatedly—guaranteed that the USA does
not transport prisoners with the aim of exposing them to
torture elsewhere [outside of the USA]. Furthermore, she
has stressed that the USA, next to torture, also does not
allow cruel, inhumane and humiliating treatment, under no
circumstances, wherever in the world, and that goes for
anyone who works for the USA (ibid. 1946).
Consequently, no action was taken by the Dutch Foreign
Ministry to start an inquiry into the ﬂight data and statistics on
CIA-planes that could have used Dutch airspace and airports.
On 17 December 2005, former US Secretary of State, Colin
Powell, stated: “the recently highlighted practice of moving
people to places where they are not covered by US law, was
neither new nor unknown to Europe” (Frost, 2005). Despite
Powell conﬁrming Europe knew about the transfers, the Dutch
Foreign Ministry did not change its attitude towards possible
public inquiries into in ERFs in the Netherlands. Two days
later, 19 December 2005, Farah Karimi of the Dutch Green Left
party (GroenLinks) asked for information about a landing of a
possible CIA-ﬂight at Rotterdam/The Hague Airport (TK, 2005e).
This and other questions regarding ERFs in the Netherlands
remained unanswered by the cabinet, which “is puzzling […]
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whereas more information seems to be available”, Karimi replied
(2006—online).
A couple of months later, on 16 March 2006, three motions
were ﬁled during a chamber debate on the CIA-ﬂights (TK, 2006).
The ﬁrst motion was ﬁled by Koenders and Karimi, requesting
diplomatic pressure to be put on the US government to disclose
information on the transport of prisoners through Dutch
airspace. They ﬁled a second motion, to adopt a “code of
conduct” for effective surveillance by EU Member States and
Eurocontrol on ERFs. The third motion was ﬁled by Lousewies
van der Laan, member of the D66, requesting consideration of
how to mitigate the reluctant attitude of the US government
towards disclosure about the ERP and ERFs. The two motions by
Koenders and Karimi were voted against; the motion of Van der
Laan was removed from the political agenda entirely, reﬂecting a
silencing of political dissent that is typical, as Chang (2011) notes,
for post 9/11 politics. Resulting from the debate, the then State
Secretary of Transport, Public Works and Water Management,
Karla Peijs, answered the question of whether the ﬂight schedules
of alleged CIA-ﬂights that were provided by Eurocontrol
contained more information on the boarded passengers. Unfor-
tunately, the exact information on those ﬂight schedules was
“state classiﬁed”, and only shared with the Council of Europe and
EP. The only information disclosed during a debate covered
(rather generic) ﬂight schedules; information that was no
different from information obtained by Dick Marty or what the
Dutch Air Trafﬁc Control had. In short, nothing of signiﬁcance
that would raise suspicion was shared.
Normalization of plausible deniability. On 12 November 2007,
Chamber Member Alexander Pechtold of the D66 asked several
critical questions to Bot’s successor, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Maxim Verhagen. Pechtold referred to former chief of the CIA
Bin Laden Unit, Michael Scheuer, who indicated that the Dutch
government already knew in 1995 about the ERP and ERFs, as the
Netherlands is one of USA’ most important partners (TK, 2007).
Verhagen responded that the Netherlands did not actively or
passively cooperate in the ERP, and that “the [Dutch] govern-
ment cannot provide absolute guarantees that the Netherlands
has never received information from allies that has been retrieved
with the help of torture” (ibid. 1385). Verhagen’s claims do not
align with Bot’s responses in 2005 and 2006 when Bot explicitly
and fully denied that the Dutch government was aware of the
ERP. Verhagen continued:
The fact that there has been, in general, some knowledge
about this instrument [ERP/ERFs], has no bearing on the
fact that the Dutch government is not aware of CIA-ﬂights
with unlawfully imprisoned suspects of terrorism, happen-
ing via Dutch territory. The government has neither
actively nor passively assisted in such ﬂights via the
Netherlands and does not possess concrete indications that
these have happened despite of it (TK, 2007: 1385).
Sir Hans-Gert Pöttering, the then EP President, problematized
the indolence of member states towards (investigating) potentially
unlawful transfers of detainees via ERFs. This led to further
scrutiny of the role of the Dutch government on 3 March 2009
during a meeting of the Dutch Senate’s European Cooperation
Committee (ESO)3 and the Dutch Justice and Home Affairs
(JBZ).4 Afterward, the ESO and JBZ sent in questions on 24
March 2009 for Verhagen. The ofﬁcial document that contains
the questions about the CIA-Rendition program, with proof mark
143316.2 u, is no longer available; the questions exist though
because they were answered5 by Verhagen on 29 June 2009
(Senate, 2009). He reemphasized that the Netherlands is very well
aware of its obligations in cases of human rights violations as a
result of ERP operations. Moreover, he stated how he and his
predecessor Bot in their communication with the USA always
condemned transfers of terrorism suspects who had no “adequate
legal safeguards” and that the Dutch government respects human
rights when ﬁghting terrorism (ibid. 3–4). So, the (facade of)
Dutch compliance with that international legality then becomes
harmful itself, because it enabled assistance to torture, while the
Dutch government was conﬁdent it was legally “walking in line”
while developing “plausible deniability” of (passive) complicity in
torture, as many more democracies tend to do (Conrad et al.,
2014). This is further shown by references made by Verhagen to
Bot’s response in 2005 to Rice’s denial of the US’ practices of
torture, once more stipulating that Bot back then “warmly
welcomed” Rice’s guarantees that the USA is not involved in
practices of torture—a refutation of accusations made against the
USA (Senate, 2009).
Both Bot’s and Verhagen’s narratives do not add up in
comparison with each other, and in fact contradict each other.
Still they both attempted to create the appearance of how the
Netherlands did not know about ERFs. It shows how, despite
being suspected of torture complicity, and thus possibly
accountable for “bizarre, horrible scenes”, “all” they had to do
was keep up an appearance of normality” (Cohen, 2002: 81), in
this case, not knowing (enough) about ERFs in the Netherlands.
So, in normalizing plausible deniability about being neither
actively nor passively involved, and despite working along with
Marty’s investigation, there was no reason to eventually also
implement Marty’s recommendations to investigate ﬂights
through Dutch airspace and landings at airports in the Nether-
lands to strengthen the national procedures to prevent illegal
transfers from happening. However, as Koenders already critically
asked on 16 March 2006:
And that’s that. Why? How does the cabinet know that it
has not been passively complicit? The cabinet has, in
compliance with the anti-torture treaty, a task to actively
investigate these cases, especially if something is going on.
The cabinet actually acknowledges something is going on,
because it cooperates in the investigation of Mr Marty.
Now, on an international level, everyone seems to wait for
everyone; the Council of Europe on the EU Member States
and vice versa. That is actually not acceptable any longer
(TK, 2006: 59–3816).
The passive complicity Koenders sheds light on, is a type of
behaviour that ﬁts the narrative of ofﬁcially denial provided by
the Dutch political elite on: unawareness and unavailability of
ERF facts; the (fabricated) acceptance of critique on that ERF
narrative; the silencing of dissenting politicians; and, ﬁnally, the
normalization of plausible deniability regarding ERF involve-
ment. That political denial comes forward from and conceals the
colonial past and, especially, colonial present of the Netherlands.
Discussion: Denial of the colonial present
Since the sixteenth century, Dutch culture has always been
praised for its tolerance and liberal values that inspired Enlight-
enment (Israel, 2004). Yet that culture of tolerance and liberalism
stands in stark contrast to colonial atrocities committed by the
Dutch East and West Indies Companies (EIC and WIC) during
the “Golden Age” (Gouda, 2008) from which that same Enlight-
enment came. Willem Kieft, a Dutch merchant (Axelrod, 2008)
was appointed by the WIC to secure economic prosperity for the
Dutch Republic (Churchill, 1997) in New Amsterdam (present-
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day New York). To do so, he had to make the Wappinger
indigenous habitants compliant with the Dutch mercantile
hunger for natural resources and proﬁteering, eventually resulting
in genocidal violence that led to almost 1000 deaths of Wappinger
natives during the 1643 Wappinger War (Schulte-Nordholt,
1966). Part of this “war”, was the “Slaughter of the Innocents” in a
town called Pavonia where children and women were horriﬁcally
executed by WIC troops under Kieft’s command. WIC head-
quarters in Amsterdam wanted Kieft to clarify what happened in
Pavonia (Axelrod, 2008: 235–236), which never happened,
because on his return to Amsterdam in September 1647,
(conveniently) his ship sunk (Murphy, 1854). Comparable are
the 1947 and 1949 Dutch massacres, coined “police actions”, in
Indonesia (a former colony of the Netherlands), leading to about
750 Indonesian deaths for which ofﬁcial apologies follow, more
than 60 years later, in 2013 (Vanvugt, 2015).6
However, the Dutch government has neither fully ofﬁcially
apologized nor has it been held fully, ofﬁcially, and thus legally
accountable for all its atrocious decolonization violence, despite
many initiatives and case-by-case apologies (Vermeulen, 2017).
Another example is that of the UN mission of DutchBat III in
Srebrenica, during the 1992–95 Bosnian war. Allegedly, by not
undertaking any action, DutchBat troops passively assisted the
July 1995 genocidal massacre of over a 1000 Muslim Bosniak men
by Bosnian Serb troops. On 29 April 2015, the Arnhem Court
ruled that the then acting Commander Thom Karremans cannot
be prosecuted; Liesbeth Zegveld, lawyer of the Bosniak women
and children who survived, intends to make an appeal at the
ECtHR (Dzidic, 2015). On 27 June 2017, Presiding Judge Dulek-
Schermers stated that the Dutchbat III soldiers “knew or should
have known that the men were not only being screened ... but
were in real danger”, making the Netherlands “partly liable for the
deaths” (Van den Berg, 2017—online source). It took 22 years for
relatives to get their victimhood partially recognized, and
therefore partially covered (only 30%) in terms of ﬁnancial
restitution (ibid.); their appeal to hold the Dutch government
responsible for failing to protect thousands more Muslims was
rejected by the court.
These atrocities may have been (inadvertently) discovered and/
or (partially) acknowledged as such, and (partially) apologized for
by the Dutch government. Yet full accountability of (other)
colonial bloodshed may (still) be ‘displaced, distorted, and (most
often) denied, [exposing] the capacities that inhere within the
colonial past [and] are routinely reafﬁrmed and reactivated in the
colonial present’ (Gregory, 2004: 7). Indeed, the Dutch colonial
capacities are reconﬁgured in the present. Meaning that, although
today the Netherlands is celebrated for its lenient drug and
prostitution policies, cultural and religious pluralism, LGBT(I)
tolerance and rights, and progressive euthanasia approaches
(Buruma, 2007), it is, as Cohen notes…
…[i]n more democratic societies [where] ofﬁcial denial is
more subtle—putting a gloss on the truth, setting the public
agenda, spin-doctoring, tendentious leaks to the media,
selective concern about suitable victims, [and] interpretive
denials regarding foreign policy […] built into the
ideological facade of the state (2002: 10).
Therefore, the present Dutch colonial capacity (of complicit
passivity) is reconﬁgured not as bluntly in the Golden Age, but
rather delicately by the contemporary Dutch political elite; a
subtle reconﬁguration of present colonialist denial that, as we
argue, is reﬂected in narrating ERF ignorance, silencing
disagreeing voices, and normalizing plausible deniability, while
conveniently hiding behind the ideological facade of governing a
progressive and democratic welfare state.
In conclusion, being in the colonial present while denying it,
the Netherlands remains (passively) complicit in gross human
rights violations, assisting today’s global policing superpowers
that outsource: “war crimes to regimes known to practice
torture”, revealing “the totalizing will to power that lies at
the crucial intersections of sovereign power and biopolitics”
(Gregory, 2010: 48). The political discourse of ERF denial is the
Dutch government’s fear of having its modern-day colonial role
in the War on Terror exposed (Gregory, 2004), and without being
challenged, the Dutch government will keep on “reactivat[ing] the
dispositions of a colonial imaginary” (ibid. 260). However, if it
wants to confront its colonial past and present, it ought to start an
ofﬁcial judicial investigation into its role in ERFs and other
alleged colonial aggressions, holding those involved accountable
not decades, even centuries post facto, but now. Only then will
the Netherlands lead by progressive example, establishing zero-
tolerance of cruelty that could sanitize what is currently a tainted
Dutch tolerance of not just torture but of a variety of colonial
atrocities."
Notes
1 In order to detain and interrogate key al-Qaeda suspects after 9/11, the CIA utilized
secret prisons, known as “black sites,” where often waterboarding to obtain intelligence
was used. It has been claimed that those secret prisons were spread over eight countries
and only the US president and a few other ofﬁcials knew (and could still know) about
them (Vitkovskaya, 2017).
2 At Rotterdam/The Hague Airport the following ERF afﬁliated aircrafts landed; 16
October 2002 an AT43 Aerospatial, number N212AZ; 15 November 2002 an AT43,
number N470JF; 27 February 2003 an AT 42, number N315CR; 7 March 2003 an AT
43, number N212AZ; 3 April 2003 an AT 43, number N315CR; and 1 September 2004
an AT 43, number N212AZ. At Princess Juliana International Airport Saint Martin, 15
April 2004 a Gulfstream G 550 plane, number N1HC, landed and allegedly complicit
in ERFs.
3 Translated from Dutch: Commissies voor Europese Samenwerkingsorganizaties.
4 Translated from Dutch: Raad Justitie en Binnenlandse Zaken.
5 Whether these were the original questions remains unclear. Perhaps more questions
were asked (or less), or asked in a different manner. If anything, the unavailability of
the document with the original set of questions is concerning.
6 The irony here is that it was a secret CIA report that described the Dutch police
actions in Indonesia, together with the Holocaust and the Great Purge by the Soviet
Union, as one of the biggest massacres of the twentieth century (Aarons, 2008: 81).
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